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DOMESTIC RELATIONS
IN SOVIET LAW
D. P. O'CONNELL*
D URING RECENT YEARS there has been a tendency to regard the changes
in the Soviet law of marriage and divorce as an admission of the
failure of Marxist social doctrine. One must, however, view those changes
with some caution; they are changes of form rather more than of sub-
stance. The basic postulates of the Marxist doctrine of the family as a
social phenomenon remain unaltered, and there has been no decisive shift
in emphasis in the civil law which they condition. It must be realized
that Soviet legal theory is still struggling to reconcile social stability with
the conception of the Soviet in its transitional phase from capitalism to
collectivism. Russian law is, in consequence, in almost every aspect in a
state of flux and characterized by experimentation. In Lenin's own words
the present state of the dictatorship of the proletariat signifies a r6gime
"not bound by fixed legal norms." If the outward forms of bourgeois legal
institutions such as marriage and the family have in recent years tended
to become more consolidated, that may imply nothing more to Soviet
theorists than a temporary and entirely utilitarian adjustment of the new
social mechanism to the traditional civil law categories. It does not
necessarily indicate a fundamental alteration in the Marxist conception of
the husband and wife and parent and child relationships. Engels' thesis
that in the classless society of the future the economic basis, and hence the
formal institution, of marriage would dissolve and be replaced by true love
and affection and a decline of prostitution, would still seem as intrinsic an
hypothesis in dogmatic Marxism as the conception of the withering away
of the state. Just, however, as the latter is being proved more and more an
illusion, so has Engels' naive conception of the family been unrealized.
While hesitating, therefore, to ascribe too much significance to the con-
temporary development in the Soviet law of marriage, one may legiti-
mately discover in it proof that concessions must be made to the natural
law if only in the interests of State expediency.
*B.A., LL.M., Ph.D., Reader in Law, University of Adelaide, Australia.
The Czarist Civil Code of Marriage was
largely of canonical origin. It required for
the validity of a marriage between Chris-
tians a religious ceremony appropriate to
the denomination of the parties. The only
exception was a marriage between sec-
tarians of the Orthodox Church known as
the Old Believers, which had to be regis-
tered by the police. The form and validity
of the marriage of non-Christians was regu-
lated by the laws or customs of the religion
or society to which the parties belonged.
Marriages of Jews were required to be in
the form prescribed by the Talmud. The
relevant religious law likewise determined
the capacity of the parties to marry. Ortho-
dox believers over eighty, for example, were
incapacitated from marrying by a synodal
decree of 1744 which asserted that "mar-
riage is established by God for the increase
of the human race, which is completely
hopeless to expect from anyone eighty years
old." Divorce was likewise a matter of ec-
clesiastical or customary law. The Russian
Eastern Christian Church permitted divorce
on the grounds of adultery, impotency, con-
viction for penal offences with deprivation
of civil rights, absence without indication of
whereabouts by one spouse for five years,
and the decision of the spouses to enter the
religious life. The divorce decrees of the
Orthodox ecclesiastical tribunals and those
of the Protestant tribunals were recognized
by the imperial law. There was no divorce
between Catholics, and questions of nullity
and separation involving Catholics were re-
served for the appropriate ecclesiastical
processes.
The Revolutionaries displayed character-
istic haste in abolishing all institutions of
status, and repudiating all natural relation-
ships of superior and inferior. Marriage in
their eyes was exclusively a matter of con-
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tract, an association based on consensus,
and in no sense organic. Lenin proclaimed
that "it is impossible to be a democrat and
a socialist without immediately demanding
complete freedom of divorce." In the first
enthusiasm of the Revolution, Bukharin stig-
matized the family as "a formidable strong.-
hold of the turpitudes of the old r6gime."
Alexandra Kollontai asserted that "the fam-
ily is ceasing to be a necessity both for its
members and the State." In 1927 Professor
Brandenburgsky, who as a legal theorist en.-
joyed a privileged position in the Soviet
hierarchy, asserted that "the family creat-
ing a series of rights and duties between
spouses, parents and children, will certainly
disappear in the course of time and be
replaced by government organization of
public education and social security." Leg.-
islation attempted to give formal recogni.-
tion to this doctrine. Two decrees of 19 and
20 December, 1917, consolidated in the
Code of 1918, abolished the old ecclesias-
tical laws and jurisdictions, and substituted
for them a new law of civil marriage and
divorce. Only civil marriage was recognized.
It could be contracted by registration and
dissolved by mutual consent. The practice
arose of divorce by postcard addressed to
the registrar's office. In the absence of mu-.
tual consent the divorce procedure was
based on the petition of one party. No
grounds other than consent or incompatibil-
ity were required. The only concession
made to the natural law in this legislation
was in the rules relating to capacity. Males
of eighteen and females of sixteen years of
age alone could contract marriage, and
marriages between ascendants and de--
scendants, brothers and sisters were pro-
scribed. The more doctrinaire elements in
the Soviet remained dissatisfied with the
survival of even these vestiges of the tradi-
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tional institution of marriage, and after
1918 the general trend of legislation was
in the direction of the complete elimination
of the concept of marriage from the law.
The 1926 Code of Marriage Laws' repre-
sents the ultimate formulation of the doc-
trinaire view. It was no longer necessary
for parties to register in order to marry.
Their de facto cohabitation, together with
circumstantial evidence of the relative per-
manence of the liaison, alone sufficed. All
judicial procedure for divorce was abol-
ished. The bond between the parties could
be severed unilaterally and without stating
reasons; when the consensus of one party
was withdrawn the basis of the marriage
disappeared. A common surname might be
employed as the parties pleased. If one
spouse changed his or her abode there was
no obligation on the part of the other to
follow. Neither spouse enjoyed any evi-
dentiary privilege in litigation involving the
other. It followed logically from this view
of marriage that not the formal institution
but mere fact created the relationship of
parent and child, and all distinction of
legitimacy was abolished. In the new mil-
lenium, which in the early 1920's was re-
garded as impending, no legal significance
whatever would be attributed to the hus-
band and wife and parent and child con-
nections. No obligation on the one side or
the other would arise from these connec-
tions. In the 1918 Code nothing was said of
the obligation of maintenance and support
save where the spouse or child was destitute,
and in this latter case the rationale of the
obligation was not a natural relationship but
the desirability of transferring from the
State to the individual the economic respon-
sibility for the non-productive elements in
I R.S.F.S.R. LAWS 1926, text 612. Translated in
2 GSOVSKI, SOVIET CIVIL LAW 239 (1948).
society. The duty of maintenance was spe-
cifically incorporated in the Code of 1926,
but again the motive was the same. The
Soviet did not intend to make a social se-
curity system a substitute for the economic
dependence of the infant and disabled upon
their next of kin. This is clear from the
judicial interpretation of the provision in
question. As the Supreme Court of the
Soviet stated in a judgment in 1929, "the
right of maintenance may not be used as a
means of promoting parasitism and leisure
of some members of the family at the
labour and expense of others."
The prevailing attitude towards sexual
relationship was reflected also in legislation
in 1920 legalizing abortion, and in the
failure of all the Soviet codes save those of
Georgia and Azerbaijan to penalize bigamy.
In those Republics the motive behind the
employment of the law in the suppression
of bigamy was the elimination of polygamy
as "a relic of tribal society, based on the
exploitation of woman's toil." The Federal
Supreme Court in 1929 even went so far
as to confirm on appeal the decision of an
inferior court that two persons were entitled
to share as wives in the distribution of a
deceased's estate. Bigamy ceased during the
1920's to have any juridical significance,
and was regarded as a sociological concept
alone. In none of the other Republics was
incest or homosexuality a criminal offence. 2
The more responsible elements in the
government of the Supreme Soviet would
seem to have been early aware of the moral
excesses which the orthodox theory and its
implementation in the law invited and en-
couraged. Lenin himself exclaimed "our
youth has gone mad, completely mad. It
has become the evil fate of many young
2 See generally BERMAN, JUSTICE IN RUSSIA ch. 12
(1950); 2 GSOVSKI, op. cit. supra note 1, at 118.
men and girls. Its devotees assert that this
is Marxist theory." Official pronouncements
on marriage became less and less extrava-
gant in their terms, and promiscuity was
increasingly discouraged. According to the
few statistics available to us, whether or not
they are reliable, the powers that be had
occasion for alarm by the mid-1930's. In
Moscow in 1935 the number of abortions
(estimated at over 12,000 a month) ex-
ceeded substantially the number of births.
In 1935 for every 1,000 marriages there
were 383 divorces. (It is assumed that the
figures relate to registered marriages, and
it may be taken that the incidence of "di-
vorce" was much higher in the case of
unregistered "marriages.") The dissolution
of family life brought additional evils in its
train, not the least of which was a stagger-
ing spread of juvenile delinquency. The
administrative branch of the Procuracy was
overburdened with the task of locating
putative fathers, entertaining affiliation suits
against them, and enforcing payment of
maintenance. Anyone with experience in
this field in our courts will appreciate the
impossible task which the Procuracy was
expected to undertake. The problem of the
unmarried mother became one of economic
urgency and national importance, especially
since it occasioned widespread absenteeism
from factories and farms.
After 1935 the pendulum began inevi-
tably to return to the opposite extreme. 3 The
traditional institutions of social stability
were consolidated by a series of steps which
indicate an awareness of the need for con-
tinuity with the past and of a sense of
tradition. The objectives were the elimina-
tion of delinquency, the increase in the
birth rate, and the integration of the family
3
TIMASHEFF, THE GREAT RETREAT 192 (1941).
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in the economic system. In their totality
those steps were characteristic of the new
phase of Soviet policy which has become
defined as "Stalinism," the indefinite pro-
jection of the "transitional stage" of Marx-
ist organization. The new line was reflected
in an article of 28 May, 1936, in Pravda:
"So called free love and loose sexual life
are throughout bourgeois and have nothing
in common either with socialistic principle
and ethics or with the rules of behaviour of
a Soviet citizen. Marriage is the most seri-
ous affair in life. Fatherhood and Mother-
hood become virtues in the Soviet." Gsovski
quotes an even more "reactionary" enuncia-
tion of Boshko, a professor of law, in an
official publication: "Marriage by its basis
and in the spirit of the Soviet law is in prin-
ciple essentially a lifelong union. Moreover,
marriage receives its full lifeblood and value
for the Soviet State only if there is birth of
children, proper upbringing, and if the
spouses experience the highest happiness of
motherhood and fatherhood." These, and
other references to the "sanctity" of mar-
riage do not imply any acceptance of the
traditional metaphysical character of the in-
stitution, but are intended to impress the
Russian people who are peculiarly awed by
whatever is sacrosanct. Nevertheless, from
1936 the tendency has been toward a meta-
physical conception of marriage, whether it
be recognized officially as such or not. After
1935 parents could be fined for the delin-
quency of their children, and were made
jointly liable with children over the age of
fourteen years for acts of intentional vio-
lence and damage. 4 This liability was ex-
tended by Decree of the Praesidium in 1941
to acts of negligence. In short, the concept
4 On the 1935 decrees, see Berman, Soviet Law
Reform - Dateline Moscow 1957, 66 YALE L. J.
1191 (1957).
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of parental responsibility was restored. In
1934 homosexuality was made an offence,
and in 1936 abortion. In 1938 judgment
was given that a marriage registered while
a previous marriage remained undissolved
did not create any juridical consequence for
the parties since "the annulment." Legal
textbooks reflected the tendency to regard
bigamy as illegal, though not necessarily
criminal. It assumed a criminal character
by legislation constituting marriage for the
sole purpose of seduction rape.
In 1934 a very practical obstacle to di-
vorce was introduced in the form of a scale
of fees. Fifty rubles was made the fee for
the first divorce, one hundred and fifty for
the second, and three hundred for subse-
quent ones. The tremendous losses in pop-
ulation during the war accelerated the proc-
ess of strengthening of the marriage bond,
and the practical result was a Decree of the
Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of 8 July
1944,1 which was inspired by the desire to
encourage large families. The preamble
stated that "care for mother and child and
support of the institution of the family have
always been among the most important
duties of the Soviet State." After providing
for unmarried mothers, establishing State
grants to large families, extending privileges
to expectant mothers, and creating a graded
tax on bachelors and fathers of small fami-
lies, the Decree proceeded to restore the
legal institution of marriage. Only a regis-
tered marriage would for the future be rec-
ognized as having legal effect, and as cre-
ating rights and duties of husband and wife
and parenthood. The mother of a child
born before the date of the Decree outside
a registered marriage might claim alimony
from the natural father after affiliation
5 1 GsovsKI, SOVIET CIVIL LAW 120 (1948).
process. After that date, however, such chil-
dren have no right to the father's name, no
succession to his property, and no claim on
his support. The mother is provided for by
the State alone. In substance, therefore, the
traditional distinction of legitimacy is re-
stored even if the terminology is not. As one
Russian commentator observes, "it remains
to be seen whether the change in legal status
will be followed in daily life by a social
stigma of illegitimacy."
To what extent the new marriage law has
conduced to a stabilizing of family relation-
ships can, however, be gauged only from a
consideration of the divorce provisions of
the Decree and their application in the
courts. The unrestricted competence of
either partner to dissolve the marriage with-
out reasons, and in opposition to the will
of the other partner, was ended, and a judi-
cial process of divorce introduced.
Divorce is no longer merely a matter of
registering the discontinuance of cohabita-
tion but constitutes an annulment of a
status relationship. It is granted not as of
right upon the withdrawal of consensus,
but only at the discretion of the court. No
grounds for divorce are stated in the De-
cree of the Praesidium, and it is the re-
sponsibility of the court in each instance to
determine whether the reasons put forward
for terminating the marriage are sufficient.
It is clear, therefore, that the Decree has
not altered the basis of Soviet marriage law,
namely the voluntary consent of the par-
ties, but has merely instituted a procedure
whereby indiscriminate changing of spouses
might be checked. This seems to be clear
from the attitude of the courts. Accurate
statistics are not available, but Sverdlov
analysed some four hundred divorce suits
decided by eighteen courts, and extracted
from them certain principles on which the
courts have acted. 6
Sixty-six per cent of the suits were ini-
tiated with the consent of the respondent.
In every such case a decree was granted,
and Sverdlov concludes that mutual con-
sent is regarded by the courts as sufficient
in itself to constitute a ground for divorce.
Of the contested suits twenty-three per cent
were refused on the grounds of absence of
guilt. In each case there were infant chil-
dren. Decrees were granted in the re-
maining contested suits on the ground of
adultery, mutual incompatibility or chronic
illness. Of the total number of petitions
presented only five to six per cent were re-
fused, and it seems that Gsovski's comment
that it is now more difficult to obtain a
divorce in the Soviet Russia than in many
capitalist countries should be treated with
caution. If there is any real restraint on
divorce it arises from certain practical con-
siderations and procedural obstruction and
not from the principle. The fees for filing
the petition and registering the decree, for
example, are scaled to restrain the irre-
sponsible. A divorce costs, according to the
court's discretion, between six hundred and
two thousand one hundred rubles (between
$150 and $550 approximately). In addi-
tion the petitioner has to pay for the pub-
lication of the papers in the suit in the local
press. The procedure-is-cumbersome. There
must be an attempt at reconciliation before
the People's Court, and only then may a
petition be presented to the divorce court.
In addition to the cases assembled by
Sverdlov several others are available which
seem to indicate that mere incompatibility
6 Sovietspoye Gosudarstro i pravo, No. 7, p. 22
(1946), translated in 11 MODERN L. REV. 163
(1948). See discussion by Wolff in 12 MODERN L.
REV. 290 (1949).
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is no ground for divorce when there are in-
fant children, and even in cases where there
are not. When two grandparents quarrelled
over the bringing up of grandchildren after
forty years of married life, a divorce granted
on this ground was reversed by the Supreme
Court of the R.S.F.S.R. In 1948 the Su-
preme Court of the U.S.S.R., in reversing
a decision of the Supreme Court of the
Azerbaijan Soviet, discussed the purpose
underlying the Decree of 1944. That De-
cree, it stated in the judgment,
is directed to the strengthening in every way
of the family and of the marital life of the
spouses. The dissolution of marriage can
consequently take place only if such facts
were established by the court as provide a
basis for considering that the family has dis-
integrated and there is no possibility of its
restoration. The reference to "incompatibil-
ity," without explanation of how it mani-
fested itself, is obviously insufficient and
cannot provide a basis for the decision pro-
nouncing the dissolution of the marriage.
The court also ought not to have overlooked
the fact that the spouses have been married
since 1945 and that they have a little boy.7
It must be noted, however, that both these
suits were disputed.
Further evidence of a trend away from
the notion of the State as the sole source of
education and in favour of the traditional
role of the parent is found in the few
reports of custody suits available to 'us: The-
Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., in an ap-
peal from the Supreme Court of Georgia,
discussed at length the basis of a grant of
custody. The court, it was held, must con-
sider primarily the interests of the child. In
doing so it must bear in mind that those
interests are not secured solely by the ma-
7 Sotsialisticheskaia Zakonnost (Socialist Legality)
No. 5, p. 60 (1948).
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terial conditions necessary for its upbring-
ing. The peculiar relation of mother and
infant was more important than any mate-
rial conditions. The case is rather signifi-
cant in view of the fact that the father, who
was a professor of pedagogy, was in a posi-
tion to give the child an advanced commu-
nist education, whereas the mother, it was
admitted, was not. Custody was neverthe-
less given to the mother.8
To what extent the modern law repre-
sents any decisive trend away from dog-
matic Marxism is difficult to decide in the
absence of more reliable facts, and it is
equally difficult and perhaps unwise to sug-
gest in what direction the law of domestic
relations will next advance. It would seem
that a tension has been set up in Soviet law,
between the conflicting demands of Marx-
ist theory, with its repudiation of all status
relationships, and the need to preserve
consonance between human nature and
social organization. The present situation is
clearly a compromise, despite the myth of
Revolutionary continuity, and is, in conse-
quence, highly unstable. It seems, however,
that the matrimonial bond will continue,
under the pressure of economics if for no
8 See BERMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 239.
other reason, to consolidate itself. The law
is creating in many directions a vested in-
terest in the permanence of marriage. When
a spouse dies, his or her share in the matri-
monial property does not fall into the estate
but is transmitted automatically to the sur-
vivor. The matrimonial home, if acquired
after marriage, can only be disposed of
with the consent of both parties. The same
tendency is emphasized in legal texts in the
assembly of matters of domestic concern
under one rubric; in the provision for guar-
dianship of infants and curatorship of
minors under rules analogous to those of
Roman law systems; in the like provision
for adoption; and in an elaborate code of
maintenance laws under which destitute or
infirm brothers, sisters, grandparents and
parents may claim support from their rela-
tives. It might be concluded, therefore, that
the types of social relation, which the Civil
Code preserved only in the interests of na-
tional expediency, are recognized to be so
fundamental as to create of their own char-
acter rights and duties which the law must
continue to recognize and protect. Soviet
law has thus ceased to be merely a tech-
nique subservient to a political goal, and is
tending to base itself, however unwilling,
ever more securely on the natural law.
